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Abstract. We describe a new algorithm for masking look-up tables of block-ciphers at any order,
as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Our technique is a generalization of the classical
randomized table countermeasure against first-order attacks. We prove the security of our new algorithm
against t-th order attacks in the usual Ishai-Sahai-Wagner model from Crypto 2003; we also improve
the bound on the number of shares from n ≥ 4t + 1 to n ≥ 2t + 1 for an adversary who can adaptively
move its probes between successive executions.
Our algorithm has the same time complexity O(n2) as the Rivain-Prouff algorithm for AES, and its
extension by Carlet et al. to any look-up table. In practice for AES our algorithm is less efficient than
Rivain-Prouff, which can take advantage of the special algebraic structure of the AES Sbox; however for
DES our algorithm performs slightly better.
1 Introduction
Side-Channel Attacks. An implementation of a cryptographic algorithm on some concrete device,
such as a PC or a smart-card, can leak additional information to an attacker through the device
power consumption or electro-magnetic emanations, enabling efficient key-recovery attacks. One of
the most powerful attack is the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [KJJ99]; it consists in recovering
the secret-key by performing a statistical analysis of the power consumption of the electronic device,
for several executions of a cryptographic algorithm. Another powerful class of attack are template
attacks [CRR02]; a template is a precise model for the noise and expected signal for all possible
values of part of the key; the attack is then carried out iteratively to recover successive parts of the
key.
Random Masking. A well-known countermeasure against side-channel attacks consists in masking
all internal variables with a random r, as first suggested in [CJRR99]. Any internal variable x is first
masked by computing x′ = x⊕ r, and the masked variable x′ and the mask r are then processed
separately. An attacker trying to analyze the power consumption at a single point will obtain only
random values; therefore, the implementation will be secure against first-order DPA. However, a
first-order masking can be broken in practice by a second-order side channel attack, in which the
attacker combines information from two leakage points [Mes00]; however such attack usually requires
a larger number of power consumption curves, which can be unfeasible in practice if the number of
executions is limited (for example, by using a counter). For AES many countermeasures based on
random masking have been described, see for example [HOM06].
More generally, one can split any variable x into n boolean shares by letting x = x1⊕ · · · ⊕xn as
in a secret-sharing scheme [Sha79]. The shares xi must then be processed separately without leaking
information about the original variable x. Most block-ciphers (such as AES or DES) alternate several
rounds, each containing one linear transformation (or more), and a non-linear transformation. A
linear function y = f(x) is easy to compute when x is shared as x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn, as it suffices
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to compute yi = f(xi) separately for every i. However securely computing a non-linear function
y = S(x) with shares is more difficult and is the subject of this paper.
The Ishai-Sahai-Wagner Private Circuit. The theoretical study of securing circuits against an
adversary who can probe its wires was initiated by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner in [ISW03]. The goal
is to protect a cryptographic implementation against side-channel attacks in a provable way. The
authors consider an adversary who can probe at most t wires of the circuit. They showed how to
transform any boolean circuit C of size |C| into a circuit of size O(|C| · t2) that is perfectly secure
against such adversary.
The Ishai-Sahai-Wagner (ISW) model is relevant even in the context of power attacks. Namely
the number of probes in the circuit corresponds to the attack order in a high-order DPA. More
precisely, if a circuit is perfectly secure against t probes, then combining t power consumption points
as in a t-th order DPA will reveal no information to the adversary. To obtain useful information
about the key the adversary will have to perform an attack of order at least t+ 1. The soundness
of higher-order masking in the context of power attacks was first demonstrated by Chari et al.
in [CJRR99], who showed that in a realistic leakage model the number of acquisitions to recover
the key grows exponentially with the number of shares. Their analysis was recently extended by
Prouff and Rivain in [PR13]. The authors proved that the information obtained by observing the
entire leakage of an execution (instead of the leakage of the n shares of a given variable) can be
made negligible in the masking order. This shows that the number of shares n is a sound security
parameter for protecting an implementation against side-channel attacks.
To protect against an adversary with at most t probes, the ISW approach consists in secret-
sharing every variable x into n shares xi where n = 2t + 1, that is x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn where
x2, . . . , xn are uniformly and independently distributed bits. An adversary probing at most n− 1
variables clearly does not learn any information about x. Processing a NOT gate is straightforward
since x¯ = x¯1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn; therefore it suffices to invert the first share x1. To process an AND
gate z = xy, one writes:
z = xy =
(
n⊕
i=1
xi
)
·
(
n⊕
i=1
yi
)
= ⊕
1≤i,j≤n
xiyj (1)
and the cross-products xiyj are processed and recombined without leaking information about
the original inputs x and y. More precisely for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n one generates random bits
ri,j and computes rj,i = (ri,j ⊕ xiyj) ⊕ xjyi; the n shares zi of z = xy are then computed as
zi = xiyi ⊕⊕j 6=i ri,j . Since there are n2 such cross-products, every AND gate of the circuit is
expanded to O(n2) = O(t2) new gates in the circuit.
The authors also describe a very convenient framework for proving the security against any set
of t probes. Namely proving the security of a countermeasure against first-order attacks (t = 1)
is usually straightforward, as it suffices to check that every internal variable has the uniform
distribution (or at least a distribution independent from the secret-key). Such approach can be
extended to second-order attacks by considering pairs of internal variables (as in [RDP08]); however
it becomes clearly unfeasible for larger values of t, as the number of t-uples to consider would grow
exponentially with t. Alternatively the ISW framework is simulation based: the authors prove the
security of their construction against a adversary with at most t probes by showing that any set of t
probes can be perfectly simulated without the knowledge of the original input variables (such as x,
y in the AND gate z = xy). In [ISW03] this is done by iteratively generating a subset I of indices of
the input shares that are sufficient to simulate the t probes; then if |I| < n the corresponding input
shares can be perfectly simulated without knowing the original input variable, simply by generating
independently and uniformly distributed bits. In the ISW construction every probe adds at most
two indices in I, so we get |I| ≤ 2t and therefore n ≥ 2t+ 1 is sufficient to achieve perfect secrecy
against a t-limited adversary. A nice property of the ISW framework is that the technique easily
extends from a single gate to the full circuit: it suffices to maintain a global subset of indices I that
is iteratively constructed from the t probes as in a single gate.
The Rivain-Prouff Countermeasure. The Rivain-Prouff countermeasure [RP10] was the first
provably secure higher-order masking scheme for the AES block-cipher. Namely, all previous masking
schemes were secure against first-order or second-order attacks only. The classical randomized
table countermeasure [CJRR99] is secure against first-order attacks only. The Schramm and Paar
countermeasure [SP06] was designed to be secure at any order n, but an attack of order 3 was shown
in [CPR07]. An alternative countermeasure based on table recomputation and provably secure
against second-order attacks was described in [RDP08], but no extension to any order is known.
The Rivain-Prouff countermeasure was therefore the first masking scheme for AES secure for any
order t ≥ 3.
The Rivain-Prouff countermeasure is an adaptation of the previous ISW construction to software
implementations, working in the AES finite field F28 instead of F2. Namely the non-linear part of the
AES Sbox can be written as S(x) = x254 over F28 , and as shown in [RP10] such monomial can be
evaluated with only 4 non-linear multiplications (and a few linear squarings). These 4 multiplications
can be evaluated with n-shared input using the previous technique based on Equation (1), by
working over the field F28 instead of F2. In order to achieve resistance against an attack of order t,
the Rivain-Prouff algorithm also requires n ≥ 2t+ 1 shares. More precisely, it was originally claimed
in [RP10] that only n ≥ t + 1 shares were required, but an attack of order d(n − 1)/2e + 1 was
identified in [CPRR13]. The authors of [CPRR13] also described a new solution with a security
proof for n ≥ t + 1 shares, but the proof for the correction only applies to a subset of the Sbox
computation.1 In summary, both the original Rivain-Prouff countermeasure and its variant from
[CPRR13] require n ≥ 2t+ 1 shares to achieve provable security, while the variant from [CPRR13]
seems heuristically secure with n ≥ t+ 1 shares only (in a restricted model of security where the
adversary always probes the same t wires, see below).
The Rivain-Prouff countermeasure was later extended by Carlet et al. to any look-up table
[CGP+12]. Namely using Lagrange interpolation any Sbox with k-bit input can be written as a
polynomial
S(x) =
2k−1∑
i=0
αi · xi
over F2k , for constant coefficients αi ∈ F2k . The polynomial can then be evaluated with n-shared
multiplications as in the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure. The authors of [CGP+12] describe two tech-
niques for optimizing the evaluation of S(x) by minimizing the number of non-linear multiplications:
the cyclotomic method and the parity-split method; the later method is asymptotically faster and
requires O(2k/2) multiplications. Therefore the Carlet et al. countermeasure with n shares has time
complexity O(2k/2 · n2), where n ≥ 2t+ 1 to ensure resistance against t-th order attacks.
Extending the randomized table countermeasure. Our new countermeasure is completely
different from the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure and its extension by Carlet et al.. Namely it is
essentially based on table recomputations and does not use multiplications over F2k . To illustrate
our technique we start with the classical randomized table countermeasure, secure against first
1Specifically Steps 1-3 and 4-6 of Algorithm 3 in [CPRR13].
order attacks only, as first suggested in [CJRR99]. The Sbox table S(u) with k-bit input is first
randomized in RAM by letting
T (u) = S(u⊕ r)⊕ s
for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, where r ∈ {0, 1}k is the input mask and s ∈ {0, 1}k is the output mask.2 To
evaluate S(x) from the masked value x′ = x ⊕ r, it suffices to compute y′ = T (x′), as we get
y′ = T (x′) = S(x′⊕ r)⊕ s = S(x)⊕ s; this shows that y′ is indeed a masked value for S(x). In other
words the randomized table countermeasure consists in first re-computing in RAM a temporary
table with inputs shifted by r and with masked outputs, so that later it can be evaluated on a
masked value x′ = x⊕ r to obtain a masked output.
A natural generalization at any order n would be as follows: given as input x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn we
would start with a randomized table with inputs shifted by x1 only, and with n− 1 output masks;
then we would incrementally shift the full table by x2 and so on until xn−1, at which point the table
could be evaluated at xn. More precisely one would initially define the randomized table
T (u) = S(u⊕ x1)⊕ s2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn
where s2, . . . , sn are the output masks, and then progressively shift the randomized table by letting
T (u)← T (u⊕ xi) for all u, iteratively from x2 until xn−1. Eventually the table would have all its
inputs shifted by x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1, so as previously one could evaluate y′ = T (xn) and obtain S(x)
masked by s2, . . . , sn.
What we have described above is essentially the Schramm and Paar countermeasure [SP06].
However as shown in [CPR07] this is insecure. Namely consider the table T (u) after the last shift by
xn−1; at this point we have T (u) = S(u⊕x1⊕· · ·⊕xn−1)⊕s2⊕· · ·⊕sn for all u. Now assume that we
can probe T (0) and T (1); we can then compute T (0)⊕T (1) = S(x1⊕· · ·⊕xn−1)⊕S(1⊕x1⊕· · ·⊕xn−1),
which only depends on x1⊕· · ·⊕xn−1; therefore it suffices to additionally probe xn to leak information
about x = x1⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1⊕ xn; this gives an attack of order 3 only for any value of n; therefore the
countermeasure can only be secure against second-order attacks.
The main issue with the previous countermeasure is that the same masks s2, . . . , sn were used to
mask all the S(u) entries, so one can exclusive-or any two lines of the randomized table and remove
all the output masks. A natural fix is to use different masks for every line S(u) of the table, so one
would write initially:
T (u) = S(u⊕ x1)⊕ su,2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ su,n
for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, and as previously one would iteratively shift the table by x2, . . . , xn−1, and also
the masks su,i separately for each i. The previous attack is thwarted because the lines of S(u) are
now masked with different set of masks. Eventually one would read T (xn), which would give S(x)
masked by sxn,2, . . . , sxn,n.
Our Table-Recomputation Countermeasure. Our new countermeasure is based on using
independent masks as above, with additionally a refresh of the masks between every successive
shifts of the input. Since the above output masks su,j are now different for all lines u of the table,
we actually have a set of n randomized tables, as opposed to a single randomized table in the
original Schramm and Paar countermeasure. Perhaps more conveniently one can view every line u
of our randomized table as a n-dimensional vector of elements in {0, 1}k, and write for all inputs
u ∈ {0, 1}k:
T (u) = (su,1, su,2, . . . , su,n)
2One can also take s = r. For simplicity we first assume that the Sbox has both k-bit input and k-bit output.
where initially each vector T (u) is a n-boolean sharing of the value S(u⊕ x1). The vectors T (u) of
our randomized table are then progressively shifted for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, first by x2 and so on until
xn−1, as in the original Schramm and Paar countermeasure. Eventually the evaluation of T (xn)
gives a vector of n output shares that corresponds to S(x).
To refresh the masks between successive shifts we can generate a random n-sharing of 0, that
is a1, . . . , an ∈ {0, 1}k such that a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an = 0 and we xor the vector T (u) with (a1, . . . , an),
independently for every u. More concretely one can use the RefreshMasks procedure from [RP10],
which consists given y = y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn in xoring both y1 and yi with tmp← {0, 1}k, iteratively
from i = 2 to n. In summary our new countermeasure is essentially the Schramm and Paar
countermeasure with independent output masks for every line of the Sbox table, and with mask
refreshing after every shift of the table; we provide a full description in Section 3.1.3
We show that our new countermeasure is secure against any attack of order t in the ISW model,
with at least n = 2t+ 1 shares. The proof works as follows. Assume that there are at most n− 3
probes; then it must be the case that at least one of the n−2 shifts of the table by xi and subsequent
mask refreshings are not probed at all. Since the corresponding mask refreshings are not probed, we
can perfectly simulate any subset of n− 1 shares at the output of those mask refreshings. Therefore
we can perfectly simulate all the internal variables up to the xi−1 shift by knowing x1, . . . , xi−1, and
any subset of n− 1 shares after the xi shift by knowing xi+1, . . . , xn. Since the knowledge of xi is
not needed in the simulation, the full simulation can be performed without knowing the original
input x, which proves the security of our countermeasure.4
Note that it does not matter how the mask refreshing is performed; the only required property
is that after a (non-probed) mask refreshing any subset of n − 1 shares among the n shares
have independent and uniform distribution; such property is clearly satisfied by the RefreshMasks
procedure from [RP10] recalled above. We stress that in the argument above only the mask refreshings
corresponding to one of the xi shift are assumed to be non-probed (which must be the case because
of the limited number of probes), and that all the remaining mask refreshings can be freely probed
by the adversary, and correctly simulated.
The previous argument only applies when the Sbox evaluation is considered in isolation. When
combined with other operations (in particular Xor gates), we must actually apply the same technique
(with the I subset) as in [ISW03], and we obtain the same bound n ≥ 2t + 1 for the number of
shares, as in the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure.
Asymptotic complexities. With respect to the number n of shares, our new countermeasure has
the same time complexity O(n2) as the Rivain-Prouff and Carlet et al. countermeasures. However
for a k-bit input table, our basic countermeasure has complexity O(2k · n2) whereas the Carlet et al.
countermeasure has complexity O(2k/2 · n2), which is better for large k.
In Section 3.3 we describe a variant of our countermeasure for processors with large register
size, with the same time complexity O(2k/2 · n2) as the Carlet et al. countermeasure, using a similar
approach as in [RDP08]. Our variant consists in packing multiple Sbox outputs into a single register,
and performing the table recomputations at the register level first. For example for DES we can
pack 8 output 4-bit nibbles into a single 32-bit register; in that case the running time is divided
3The mask refreshing is necessary to prevent a different attack. Assume that we probe the first component of T (0)
for the initial configuration of the table T (u), and we again probe the first component of T (0) when the table T (u)
has eventually been shifted by x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1. If x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1 = 0 then without mask refreshing those two probed
values must be the same; this leaks information about x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1, and therefore it suffices to additionally probe
x1 and xn to have an attack of order 4 for any n.
4The previous argument could be extended to the optimal number of probes n−1 by considering the initial sharing
of S(u⊕ x1) and by adding a final mask refreshing after the evaluation of T (xn), as actually done in Section 3.1.
by a factor 8. We stress that our variant does not consist in putting multiple shares of the same
variable into a single register, as reading such register would reveal many shares at once, and thereby
decrease the number of probes t required to break the countermeasure.
Note that our countermeasure has memory complexity O(n), instead of O(n2) for the Rivain-
Prouff countermeasure as described in [RP10]. However we show in Appendix B that the memory
complexity of the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure can be reduced to O(n), simply by computing the
variables in a different order; this extends to the Carlet et al. countermeasure. We summarize in
Table 1 the complexity of the two countermeasures.
Countermeasure Time Memory Randomness
Carlet et al. [CGP+12] O(2k/2 · n2) O(2k/2 · n) O(k2k/2 · n2)
Table Recomputation O(2k · n2) O(2k · n) O(k2k · n2)
Table Recomputation (large register) O(2k/2 · n2) O(2k · n) O(k2k · n2)
Table 1. Time, memory, and number of random bits used, for a k-bit input table masked with n shares and secure
against any attack at order t, with 2t + 1 ≤ n.
Protecting a full Block-Cipher. We show how to integrate our countermeasure into the pro-
tection of a full block-cipher against t-th order attacks. We consider two models of security. In
the restricted model, the adversary always probes the same t intermediate variables for different
executions of the block-cipher. In the full model the adversary can change the position of its probes
adaptively between successive executions; this is essentially the ISW model for stateful circuits.
The restricted model is relevant in practice because in a t-th order DPA attack, the statistical
analysis is performed on a fixed set of t intermediate variables for all executions. In both models the
key is initially provided in shared form as input, with n shares. In the full model it is necessary to
re-randomize the shares of the key between executions, since otherwise the adversary could recover
the key by moving its probes between successive executions; obviously this re-randomization of
shares must also be secure against a t-th order attack.
We show that n ≥ 2t + 1 is sufficient to achieve security against t-th order attacks in both
models. In particular, this improves the bound n ≥ 4t+ 1 from [ISW03] for stateful circuits.5 We
get an improved bound because for every execution we use both an initial re-randomization of the
key shares (before they are used to evaluate the block-cipher) and a final re-randomization of the
key shares (before they are given as input to the next execution), whereas in [ISW03] only a final
re-randomization was used. With the same technique we can obtain the same improved bound in
the full model for the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure and its extension by Carlet et al..
Note that in the full model the bound n ≥ 2t+1 is actually optimal. Namely as noted in [ISW03]
the adversary can probe t of the key shares at the end of one execution and then another t of the key
shares at the beginning of the next execution, hence a total of 2t key shares of the same n-sharing
of the secret-key. Hence n ≥ 2t+ 1 shares are necessary.6
Practical Implementation. Finally we have performed a practical implementation of our new
countermeasure for both AES and DES, using a 32-bit architecture so that we could apply our
5In [ISW03] the bounds are n ≥ 2t + 1 for stateless circuits and n ≥ 4t + 1 for stateful circuits.
6At least this holds for the shares of the secret-key. It could be that n = t + 1 shares are sufficient for the other
variables.
large register variant. For comparison we have also implemented the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure
for AES and the Carlet et al. countermeasure for DES; for the latter we have used the technique
from [RV13], in which the evaluation of a DES Sbox requires only 7 non-linear multiplications. We
summarize the result of our practical implementations in Section 5. We obtain that in practice
for AES our algorithm is less efficient than Rivain-Prouff, which can take advantage of the special
algebraic structure of the AES Sbox; however for DES our algorithm performs slightly better. Our
implementation is publicly available [Cor13].
2 Definitions
In this section we first recall the Ishai-Sahai-Wagner (ISW) framework [ISW03] for proving the
resistance of circuits against probing attacks. In [RP10] Rivain and Prouff describe an adaptation of
the ISW model for software implementations. We follow the same approach and describe two security
models: a restricted model in which the adversary always probes the same t intermediate variables
(which is essentially the model considered in [RP10]), and a full model in which the t probes can be
changed adaptively between executions (which is essentially the ISW model for stateful circuits).
2.1 The Ishai-Sahai-Wagner Framework
Privacy for Stateless Circuits. A stateless circuit over F2 is a directed acyclic graph whose
sources are labeled with the input variables, sinks are labeled with output variables, and internal
vertices stand for function gates. A stateless circuit can be randomized, if it additionally contains
random gates; every such gate has no input, and its only output at each invocation of the circuit is
a uniform random bit.
A t-limited adversary can probe up to t wires in the circuit, and has unlimited computational
power. A stateless circuit C is called (perfectly) secure against such adversary, if the distribution
of the probes can be efficiently and perfectly simulated, without access to the internal wires of C.
For stateless circuits one assumes that the inputs and outputs of the circuit must remain private.
For example in a block-cipher the input key must remain private. To prevent the adversary for
learning the inputs and outputs one uses an input encoder I and an output decoder O, whose
internal wires cannot be probed. Additionally, the inputs of I and the outputs of O are also assumed
to be protected against probing. However, the outputs of I and the inputs to O can be probed.
Finally the t-private stateless transformer (T, I, O) maps a stateless circuit C into a (randomized)
stateless circuit C ′, such that C ′ is secure against the t-limited adversary, and O ◦ C ′ ◦ I has the
same input-output functionality as C.
We illustrate this property with a simple circuit C computing a single xor gate z = x⊕ y. The
input encoder I would first generate independent uniform bits x2, . . . , xn, and let x1 = x⊕x2⊕· · ·⊕xn.
Note that x1 is also a uniform random bit, and x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn. If the adversary can only read
t = n− 1 of the n wires x1, . . . , xn, then the adversary’s behavior can be efficiently simulated by
an adversary who cannot probe any of these wires. Namely any t of these wires are independently
and uniformly distributed random bits; therefore the probed values can be simulated by picking t
independent random bits. Note that this does not reveal any information about x; however n = t+ 1
wires are sufficient to recover x. The input encoder I would proceed similarly with y = y1⊕ · · · ⊕ yn.
The modified circuit C ′ would compute the wires zi = xi ⊕ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Eventually the
output decoder O would compute z = z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zn. Since all the shares xi, yi are manipulated
separately, the modified circuit C ′ is clearly secure against an adversary with at most t = n − 1
probes.
The ISW Construction. As recalled in introduction in [ISW03] the authors showed how to
transform any boolean circuit C of size |C| into a circuit of size O(|C| · t2) that is perfectly secure
against a t-limited adversary. The approach in [ISW03] consists in secret-sharing every variable x
into n shares xi where n = 2t + 1, that is x = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn where x2, . . . , xn are uniformly
and independently distributed bits. The authors prove the security of their construction against a
t-limited adversary by showing that any set of t probes can be perfectly simulated without knowing
the internal wires of the circuit, for n ≥ 2t+ 1.
Extension to Stateful Circuits. The ISW model and construction can be extended to stateful
circuits, that is a circuit containing memory cells. In the stateful model the inputs and outputs
are known to the attacker and one does not use the input encoder I and output decoder O. For
a block-cipher the secret key sk would be originally incorporated in a shared form ski inside the
memory cells of the circuit; the key shares ski would be re-randomized after each invocation of
the circuit. The authors show that for stateful circuits n ≥ 4t+ 1 shares are sufficient for security
against a t-limited adversary; we refer to [ISW03] for more details.
2.2 Security Model for Software Implementations
In [RP10] Rivain and Prouff describe an adaptation of the ISW model for software implementations
of encryption algorithms. They consider a randomized encryption algorithm E taking as input a
plaintext m and a randomly shared secret-key sk and outputting a ciphertext c, with additional
access to a random number generator. More precisely the secret-key sk is assumed to be split into
n shares sk1, . . . , skn such that sk = sk1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ skn and any (n − 1)-uple of ski’s is uniformly
and independently distributed. Instead of considering the internal wires of a circuit, they consider
the intermediate variables of the software implementation. This approach seems well suited for
proving the security of our countermeasure; in principle one could write our countermeasure with
randomized table as a stateful circuit and work in the ISW model for stateful circuits, but that
would be less convenient.
In the following we describe two different models of security. In the restricted model the adversary
provides a message m as input and receives c = Esk(m) as output. The adversary can run Esk
several times, but she always obtain the same set of t intermediate variables that she can freely
choose before the first execution. In the full model, the adversary can adaptively change the set
of t intermediate variables between executions. In both models the shares ski of the secret-key sk
are initially incorporated in the memory cells of the block-cipher implementation. We say that a
randomized encryption algorithm is secure against t-th order attack (in the restricted or full model)
if the distribution of any t intermediate variables can be perfectly simulated without the knowledge
of the secret-key sk. This implies that anything an adversary A can do from the knowledge of t
intermediate variables, another adversary A′ can do the same without the knowledge of those t
intermediate variables. Note that since A initially provides the message m and receives the ciphertext
c, we can consider that both m and c are public and given to the simulator.
Note that in the full model it is necessary to re-randomize in memory the shares ski of the key,
since otherwise the adversary could recover sk by moving its probes between successive executions;
obviously this re-randomization of shares must also be secure against a t-th order attack.
3 Our New Algorithm
3.1 Description
In this section we describe our new algorithm for computing y = S(x) where
S : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k′
is a look-up table with k-bit input and k′-bit output. Our new algorithm takes as input x1, . . . , xn
such that x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn and must output y1, . . . , yn such that y = S(x) = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn, without
leaking information about x. Our algorithm uses two temporary tables T and T ′ in RAM; both
have k-bit input and a vector of n elements of k′-bit as output, namely
T, T ′ : {0, 1}k → ({0, 1}k′)n
Given a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) of n elements, we write ⊕(v) = v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vn. We denote by T (u)[j]
and T ′(u)[j] the j-th component of the vectors T (u) and T ′(u) respectively, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In
practice the two tables can be implemented as 2-dimensional arrays of elements in {0, 1}k′ . We use
the same RefreshMasks procedure as in [RP10].
Algorithm 1 Masked computation of y = S(x)
Input: x1, . . . , xn such that x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn
Output: y1, . . . , yn such that y = S(x) = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn
1: for all u ∈ {0, 1}k do
2: T (u)← (S(u), 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ({0, 1}k′)n . ⊕(T (u)) = S(u)
3: end for
4: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
5: for all u ∈ {0, 1}k do
6: for j = 1 to n do T ′(u)[j]← T (u⊕ xi)[j] . T ′(u)← T (u⊕ xi)
7: end for
8: for all u ∈ {0, 1}k do
9: T (u)← RefreshMasks(T ′(u)) . ⊕(T (u)) = S(u⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xi)
10: end for
11: end for . ⊕(T (u)) = S(u⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1) for all u ∈ {0, 1}k.
12: (y1, . . . , yn)← RefreshMasks
(
T (xn)
)
. ⊕(T (xn)) = S(x)
13: return y1, . . . , yn
Algorithm 2 RefreshMasks
Input: z1, . . . , zn such that z = z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zn
Output: z1, . . . , zn such that z = z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zn
1: for j = 2 to n do
2: tmp← {0, 1}k′
3: z1 ← z1 ⊕ tmp
4: zj ← zj ⊕ tmp
5: end for
6: return z1, . . . , zn
Correctness. It is easy to verify the correctness of Algorithm 1. We proceed by induction. Assume
that at Line 4 for index i we have for all inputs u ∈ {0, 1}k:
⊕(T (u)) = S(u⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xi−1) (2)
The assumption clearly holds for i = 0, since initially we have ⊕(T (u)) = S(u) for all inputs
u ∈ {0, 1}k. Assuming that (2) holds for index i at Line 4, after the shifts performed at Line 6 we
have for all inputs u ∈ {0, 1}k,
⊕(T ′(u)) = ⊕(T (u⊕ xi)) = S((u⊕ xi)⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xi−1) = S(u⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xi)
and therefore the assumption holds at Step i+ 1. At the end of the loop we have therefore
⊕(T (u)) = S(u⊕ x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn−1)
for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, and then⊕(T (xn)) = S(xn⊕x1⊕· · ·⊕xn−1) = S(x) which gives y1⊕· · ·⊕yn = S(x)
as required. This proves the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Remark 1. A NAND gate can be implemented as a 2-bit input, 1-bit output look-up table; therefore
Algorithm 1 can be used to protect any circuit, with the same complexity O(n2) in the number of
shares n as the ISW construction.
3.2 Security Proof
The following Lemma proves the security of our countermeasure against t-th order attacks, for any t
such that 2t+ 1 ≤ n. The proof is done in the ISW model [ISW03]. Namely we show that from any
given set of t probed intermediate variables, one can define a set I ⊂ [1, n] with |I| < n such that the
knowledge of the input indices x|I := (xi)i∈I is sufficient to perfectly simulate those t intermediate
variables. Then since |I| < n those input shares can be perfectly simulated without knowing the
original input variable, simply by generating independently and uniformly distributed variables.
Lemma 1. Let (xi)1≤i≤n be the input shares of Algorithm 1 and let t be such that 2t < n. For any
set of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t < n and
the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from the shares x|I . The output shares
y|I can also be perfectly simulated from x|I .
Proof. Given a set of t intermediate variables v1, . . . , vt probed by the adversary, we construct a
subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated
from x|I . We call Part i the computation performed within the main for loop for index i for
1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, that is from Line 5 to Line 10 of Algorithm 1; similarly we call Part n the computation
performed at Line 12. We do not consider the intermediate variables from Line 2, as they can be
perfectly simulated without the knowledge of x.
The proof intuition is as follows. Every intermediate variable vh is identified by its “line” index
i corresponding to the Part in which it appears, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and by its “column” index j
corresponding to the j-th component of the vector in which it appears; for any such intermediate
variable vh both indices i and j are added to the subset I (except for xi and the tmp variables
within RefreshMasks for which only i is added). The crucial observation is the following: if i /∈ I, then
no intermediate variable was probed within Part i of Algorithm 1; in particular the tmp variables
within the corresponding RefreshMasks were not probed. Therefore we can perfectly simulate the
outputs of the RefreshMasks function which have “column” index j ∈ I, by generating uniform and
independent elements in {0, 1}k′ , as long as |I| < n. This means that for i /∈ I we can perfectly
simulate all variables T (u)[j] for j ∈ I in Line 9. Considering now Part i for which i ∈ I, since
we know xi we can still perfectly simulate all intermediate variables with “column” index j ∈ I
(including also the tmp variables within RefreshMasks), which includes by definition of I all the
intermediates variables vh. Therefore all intermediate variables vh can be perfectly simulated as
long as |I| < n, which gives the condition 2t < n.
Formally the procedure for constructing the set I is as follows:
1. We start with I = ∅.
2. For any intermediate variable vh:
(a) If vh = xi or vh = u⊕ xi at Line 6, then add i to I.
(b) If vh = T (u⊕ xi)[j] or vh = T ′(u)[j] at Line 6 in Part i, then add both i and j to I.
(c) If vh = T
′(u)[j] or vh = T (u)[j] at Line 9 in Part i, then add both i and j to I.
(d) If vh = tmp for any tmp within RefreshMasks in Part i (either at Line 9 or 12), then add i to
I.
(e) If vh = xn at Line 12, then add n to I.
(f) If vh = T (xn)[j] or vh = yj at Line 12, then add both n and j to I.
This terminates the description of the procedure for constructing the set I. Since any intermediate
variable vh adds at most two indices in I, we must have |I| ≤ 2t < n.
We now show how to complete a perfect simulation of all intermediate variables vh using only
the values x|I . We proceed by induction. Assume that at the beginning of Part i we can perfectly
simulate all variables T (u)[j] for all j ∈ I and all u ∈ {0, 1}k. This holds for i = 1 since initially we
have T (u) = (S(u), 0, . . . , 0) which does not depend on x.
We distinguish two cases. If i /∈ I then no tmp variable within the RefreshMasks in Part i has
been probed. Therefore we can perfectly simulate all intermediate variables T (u)[j] for j ∈ I at the
output of RefreshMasks at Line 9, or similarly all yj for j ∈ I at the output of RefreshMasks at Line
12 when i = n, as long as |I| < n. Formally this can be proven as follows. Let j∗ be such that j∗ /∈ I.
Since the internal variables of the RefreshMasks are not probed, we can redefine RefreshMasks where
the randoms tmp are accumulated inside zj∗ instead of z1. Since j
∗ /∈ I we have that zj∗ is never
used in the computation of any variable vh, and therefore every variables zj for j ∈ I is masked
by a random tmp which is used only once. Therefore at the output of RefreshMasks the variables
T (u)[j] for j ∈ I can be perfectly simulated for all u ∈ {0, 1}k, simply by generating uniform and
independent values.
If i ∈ I then knowing xi we can perfectly simulate all intermediate variables with column index
j ∈ I in Part i. Namely our induction hypothesis states that at the beginning of Part i the variables
T (u)[j] for all j ∈ J can already be perfectly simulated. Knowing xi we can therefore propagate the
simulation for all variables with column index j and perfectly simulate T (u⊕ xi)[j], T ′(u)[j] and
the resulting T (u)[j] at Line 9, and similarly the variables yj at Line 12 if i = n; in particular the
tmp variables within RefreshMasks are simulated exactly as in the RefreshMasks procedure.
Since in both cases we can perfectly simulate all intermediate variables T (u)[j] for j ∈ I at the
end of Part i, the induction hypothesis holds for i+ 1; therefore it holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. From the
reasoning above we can therefore simulate all intermediate variables in Part i with column index j
such that i, j ∈ I; by definition of I this includes all intermediate variables vh, and all output shares
y|I ; this proves Lemma 1. uunionsq
Remark 2. Although n ≥ 2t + 1 shares are required for the security proof, our countermeasure
seems heuristically secure with n ≥ t+ 1 shares only in the restricted model, as the variant of the
Rivain-Prouff countermeasure from [CPRR13].
3.3 A Variant for Processors with Large Registers
With respect to the number n of shares, our new countermeasure has the same time complexity
O(n2) as the Rivain-Prouff and Carlet et al. countermeasures. However for a k-bit input table,
our algorithm has complexity O(2k · n2) whereas the Carlet et al. countermeasure has complexity
O(2k/2 · n2) only.
In this section we describe a variant of our countermeasure with the same complexity as Carlet et
al., but for processors with large enough register size ω bits, using a similar approach as in [RDP08,
Section 3.3]. We assume that a read/write operation on such register takes unit time. As previously
the goal is to compute y = S(x) where
S : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k′
is a look-up table with k-bit input and k′-bit output.
Under the variant the k′-bit outputs of S are first packed into register words of ω = ` · k′ bits,
where ` is assumed to be a power of two. For example, for a DES Sbox with k = 6 input bits and
k′ = 4 output bits, on a ω = 32 bits architecture we can pack ` = 8 output 4-bit nibbles into a
32-bit word. Formally, we define a new Sbox S′ with k1-bit input and ω = ` · k′ bits output with
S′(a) = S(a ‖ 0k2) ‖ · · · ‖ S(a ‖ 1k2)
for all a ∈ {0, 1}k1 , where k = k1 + k2 and k2 = log2 `. To compute S(x) for x ∈ {0, 1}k, we proceed
in two steps:
1. Write x = a‖b for a ∈ {0, 1}k1 and b ∈ {0, 1}k2 , and compute z = S′(a) = S(a‖0k2)‖ · · · ‖S(a‖1k2)
2. Viewing z as a k2-bit input and k
′-bit output table, compute y = z(b) = S(x).
We must show how to compute y = S(x) with the two steps above when the input x is shared
with n shares xi. In the first step we proceed as in Algorithm 1, except that the new table S
′ has a
k1-bit input instead of a k-bit input, and ω = ` · k′-bit output instead of k′-bit output. Note that
the table S′ contains 2k1 = 2k−k2 = 2k/` elements instead of 2k for the original S. Since we assume
that a read/write operation on a ω-bit register takes unit time, the complexity of the first step is
now O(2k/` · n2). Note that S and S′ take the same amount of memory in RAM; in the first step of
our countermeasure we can achieve a speed-up by a factor ` because we are moving ` blocks of k′
bits at a time inside registers of size ω = ` · k′ bits.
The second step requires a slight modification of Algorithm 1. Namely we must view the output
z from Step 1 as a look-up table with k2-bit input and k
′-bit output. However this output z is now
obtained in shared form, namely we get shares z1, . . . , zn such that z = z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zn, whereas in
Algorithm 1 the look-up table S(x) is a public table. This is not a problem, as we can simply keep
this table in shared form when initializing the T (u) table at Line 2 of Algorithm 1. More precisely
in the second step we can initialize the table T (u) with:
T (u) = (z1(u), . . . , zn(u)) ∈ ({0, 1}k′)n
for all u ∈ {0, 1}k2 , and we still have ⊕(T (u)) = z(u) for all u as required. The rest of Algorithm 1
is the same. Since the second step uses a table of size 2k2 = ` elements, its complexity is O(` · n2).
The full complexity of our variant countermeasure is therefore O((2k/`+`)·n2). This is minimized
for ` = 2k/2. If we have large enough register size ω so that we can take ` = ω/k′ = 2k/2, then the
complexity of our variant countermeasure becomes O(2k/2 · n2), the same complexity as the Carlet
et al. countermeasure.7,8,9
The following Lemma shows that our variant countermeasure achieves the same level of security
as Algorithm 1; the proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 1 and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 2. Let (xi)1≤i≤n be the input shares of the above countermeasure for large register size,
and let t be such that 2t < n. For any set of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n]
of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t < n and the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated
from the xi’s with i ∈ I. The output shares y|I can also be perfectly simulated from x|I .
4 Higher Order Masking of a Full Block-Cipher
In this section we show how to integrate our countermeasure into a full block-cipher. We consider a
block-cipher with the following operations: Xor operation z = x⊕ y, linear (or affine) transform
y = f(x), and look-up table y = S(x). This covers both AES and DES block-ciphers. We show how
to apply high-order masking to these operations, in order to protect a full block-cipher against t-th
order attacks.10
Xor operation. We consider a Xor operation z = x⊕ y. Taking as input the shares xi and yi such
that x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn and y = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn, it suffices to compute the shares zi = xi ⊕ yi.
Linear operation. We consider a linear operation y = f(x). Taking as input the shares xi such
that x = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn, it suffices to compute the shares yi = f(xi) separately.
Table Look-up. A table look-up y = S(x) is computed using our previous Algorithm 1.
Input Encoding. Given x as input, we first encode x as x1 = x and xi = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Secondly
we let (x1, . . . , xn)← RefreshMasks(x1, . . . , xn).
Output Decoding. Given y1, . . . , yn as input, we compute y = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn using Algorithm 3
below.
Key Shares Refreshing. As mentioned in Section 2.2 we must re-randomize the key shares
between successive executions of the block-cipher in order to achieve security in the full model.
Using Algorithm 4 below we perform both an initial Key Shares Refreshing (before the shares ski
are used to evaluate the block-cipher), and a final Key Shares Refreshing (before the key shares ski
are stored for the next execution).11
This terminates the description of our randomized encryption algorithm. The following theorem
proves the security of the randomized encryption scheme defined above in the full model, under the
condition n ≥ 2t+ 1; we give the proof in Appendix A. This improves the bound n ≥ 4t+ 1 from
7In principle the same procedure could be applied recursively, and the total complexity would become O(k · n2)
instead of O(2k/2 · n2) for large enough registers. However since the look-up table input size k is usually small (k ≤ 8)
this is unlikely to make a difference in practice.
8Since the Carlet et al. countermeasure is based on computing in the field F2k , it is unclear how the Carlet et al.
countermeasure could benefit from larger register sizes; so it seems that its complexity remains O(2k/2 · n2) even for
large register size.
9Note that for DES with 32-bit registers we can take the optimum ` = 26/2 = 8. However for AES the optimum
` = 28/2 = 16 would require 128-bit registers.
10Xor is a linear operation, so one could consider the linear operation y = f(x) only, but it seems more convenient
to consider the Xor operation separately.
11Note that for both algorithms 3 and 4 the RefreshMasks procedure must be applied with the tmp randoms
generated with the appropriate bit-size (instead of k′).
Algorithm 3 Shares recombination
Input: y1, . . . , yn
Output: y such that y = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn
1: for i = 1 to n do (y1, . . . , yn)← RefreshMasks(y1, . . . , yn)
2: c← y1
3: for i = 2 to n do c← c⊕ yi
4: return c
Algorithm 4 Key Shares Refreshing
Input: sk1, . . . , skn such that sk = sk1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ skn
Output: sk1, . . . , skn such that sk = sk1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ skn
1: for i = 1 to n do (sk1, . . . , skn)← RefreshMasks(sk1, . . . , skn)
2: return sk1, . . . , skn
[ISW03] for stateful circuits. We stress that any set of t intermediate variables can be probed by
the adversary, including variables in the input encoding, output decoding, and key shares refreshing;
that is, no operation is assumed to be leak-free.
Theorem 1. The randomized encryption scheme defined above achieves t-th order security in the
full model for n ≥ 2t+ 1.
Remark 3. The input encoding operation need not be randomized by RefreshMasks; this is because
the input x is public and given to the simulator, who can therefore perfectly simulate the initial
shares x|I for any subset I ⊂ [1, n]. Moreover in the restricted model the key shares refreshing is not
necessary. In practice we can keep both operations as their time complexity is only O(n) and O(n2)
respectively.
Remark 4. We stress that the secret key sk must be initially provided with randomized shares, since
sk is secret and not given to the simulator; in other words it would be insecure for the randomized
block-cipher to receive sk as input and perform the initial input encoding on sk by himself.
Remark 5. In the output decoding operation we perform a series of n mask refreshing before
computing y. This is to enable a correct simulation of the intermediate variables c at Line 3 in case
they are probed by the adversary.
5 Practical Implementation
We have performed a practical implementation of our new countermeasure for both AES and DES,
using a 32-bit architecture so that we could apply our large register variant. More precisely we
could pack ` = 4 output bytes for AES, and ` = 8 output 4-bit nibbles for DES. For comparison
we have also implemented the Rivain-Prouff countermeasure [RP10] for AES and the Carlet et al.
countermeasure [CGP+12] for DES; for the latter we have used the technique from [RV13], in which
the evaluation of a DES Sbox requires only 7 non-linear multiplications. The performances of our
implementations are summarized in Table 2. We use the bound n = 2t + 1 for the full model of
security (which implies security in the restricted model).
We obtain that in practice for AES our algorithm is an order of magnitude less efficient than
Rivain-Prouff, which can take advantage of the special algebraic structure of the AES Sbox; however
for DES our algorithm performs slightly better than the Carlet et al. countermeasure. Note that
this holds for a 32-bit architecture; on a 8-bit architecture the comparison could be less favorable.
The source code of our implementations is publicly available [Cor13].
t n Rand Mem Time PF
AES 0.0018 1
AES, RP 1 3 2.1 20 0.092 50
AES, TR 1 3 44 1579 0.80 439
AES, RP 2 5 6.8 30 0.18 96
AES, TR 2 5 176 2615 2.2 1205
AES, RP 3 7 14 40 0.31 171
AES, TR 3 7 394 3651 4.4 2411
AES, RP 4 9 24 50 0.51 276
AES, TR 4 9 700 4687 7.3 4003
t n Rand Mem Time PF
DES 0.010 1
DES, RP 1 3 2.8 72 0.47 47
DES, TR 1 3 8.5 423 0.31 31
DES, RP 2 5 9.2 118 0.78 79
DES, TR 2 5 33 691 0.59 59
DES, RP 3 7 19 164 1.3 129
DES, TR 3 7 75 959 0.90 91
DES, RP 4 9 33 210 1.9 189
DES, TR 4 9 133 1227 1.4 142
Table 2. Comparison of secure AES and DES implementations, for the Rivain-Prouff (RP) countermeasure, and our
Table Recomputation (TR) countermeasure. The implementation was done in C on a MacBook Air running on a
1.86 GHz Intel processor. We denote the number of calls to the random number generator (times 103), the required
memory in bytes (only for the Sbox computation part), the total running time in ms, and the Penalty Factor (PF)
compared the the unmasked implementation.
One could think that because of the large penalty factors the countermeasures above are
unpractical. However in some applications the block-cipher evaluation can be only a small fraction
of the full protocol (for example in a challenge-response authentication protocol), and in that case a
penalty factor of say 100 for a single block-cipher evaluation may be acceptable.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
As mentioned in introduction, a nice property of the ISW framework is that the simulation technique
easily extends from a single gate to the full circuit: it suffices to maintain a global subset of indices
I that is iteratively constructed from the t probes as in a single gate. Therefore to prove Theorem 1
we proceed in two steps: we first explain how the subset I is constructed for each of the elementary
operations from Section 4; then we show how to derive a proof of security for the full block-cipher,
first in the restricted model and then in the full model.
A.1 Security of Elementary Operations
For the Xor operation and the Linear operation, the construction of the subset I is straightforward.
Lemma 3. Let (xi)1≤i≤n and (yi)1≤i≤n be the input shares of the Xor operation. For any set of
t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t and the
distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from x|I and y|I . The output shares z|I
can also be perfectly simulated from x|I and y|I .
Proof. For any probed variable xi or yi or zi = xi ⊕ yi, we add i to I. We get |I| ≤ t. Any such
variable can be simulated by knowing the values x|I and y|I . uunionsq
Lemma 4. Let (xi)1≤i≤n be the input shares of the Linear operation. For any set of t intermediate
variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t and the distribution of those t
variables can be perfectly simulated from x|I . The output shares y|I can also be perfectly simulated
from x|I .
Proof. For any probed variable xi or yi = f(xi) or any intermediate variable in the computation
of f(xi), we add i to I. We get |I| ≤ t. Any such variable can be simulated by knowing the values
x|I . uunionsq
The look-up table operation is computed using Algorithm 1, and the construction of I is given
in the proof of Lemma 1.
For the Initial Encoding operation we don’t need to include any index i in I; namely the input
x is assumed to be public and given to the simulator.
Lemma 5. Let x be the public input of the Initial Encoding operation. For any set of t intermediate
variables, the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from x. All output shares xi
can be perfectly simulated.
Proof. The initial shares xi with x1 = x and xi = 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n can be computed from x.
The variables in RefreshMasks can then be perfectly simulated. As noted previously this initial
RefreshMasks is actually unnecessary. uunionsq
In the Output Decoding operation of Algorithm 3 we first perform a series of n mask refreshing
before computing y. This is to enable a correct simulation of the intermediate variables c at Line
3 in case they are probed by the adversary. Note that the output y is assumed to be public and
given to the simulator. Heuristically this series of n mask refreshing seems necessary; otherwise to
correctly simulate the intermediate variables c one would need to know all the shares yi, which does
not seem possible in the simulation.
Lemma 6. Let (yi)1≤i≤n be the input shares of the Output Decoding operation. For any set of t
intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t and the distribution
of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from y|I and y = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn.
Proof. We first consider the series of n RefreshMasks. If any variable yj is probed inside any of the
RefreshMasks, we add j to I.
Moreover since t < n there must be at least one RefreshMasks that is not probed at all; let
denote by i∗ the index of this RefreshMasks. Since we know y = y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ yn, we can therefore
perfectly simulate all the shares (yi)1≤i≤n after this i∗-th RefreshMasks. Therefore we can perfectly
simulate all yi’s until the last RefreshMasks, and all intermediate variables c for computing y.
In summary before the i∗ RefreshMasks knowing the input shares y|I we can perfectly simulate
all intermediate variables yj for j ∈ I, and after the i∗ RefreshMasks we can perfectly simulate all
intermediate variables. This proves Lemma 6. uunionsq
Finally we show how to construct the subset I for the Key Shares Refreshing from Algorithm 4.
The following lemma is straightforward and will be used in the restricted model of security only. As
mentioned previously the Key Shares Refreshing operation is actually unnecessary in the restricted
model, however it will be required in the full model, for which we will prove the stronger lemmas 8,
9 and 10 below.
Lemma 7. Let (ski)1≤i≤n be the input shares of Algorithm 4. For any set of t intermediate variables,
there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t and the distribution of those t variables
can be perfectly simulated from the values sk|I . The output shares sk′|I can be perfectly simulated
from sk|I
Proof. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation is probed, we add j to I. We get |I| ≤ t ≤ 2t,
and we can perfectly simulate those t intermediate variables from the input values sk|I , as well as
the output shares sk′|I . uunionsq
A.2 Security of the full Block-Cipher in the Restricted Model
In this section we prove the security of the full block-cipher against t-th order attacks in the restricted
model, using essentially the same reasoning as in [ISW03]. We first restrict ourselves to a single
execution of the randomized block-cipher.
For the full block-cipher we compute a global subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices by examining each
n-shared operation in the randomized block-cipher. We have seen in the previous section that in
each n-shared operation a probe adds at most 2 indices in I. Since a total of t intermediate variables
in the full block-cipher can be probed by the adversary, the size of the set I will still be bounded by
2t. The simulation is then performed as in the proof of Lemma 1, from the input of the randomized
block-cipher to the output. The input shares sk|I of the block-cipher can be perfectly simulated
as long as |I| < n, by generating uniform and independent values. Moreover we have shown in the
previous lemmas that the output shares y|I of all operations can always be simulated given the input
shares with indices in I. Therefore we can maintain the invariant that for each n-shared operation
g, the shares of the inputs to g with indices in I are perfectly simulated. Inductively the values of
all t intermediate variables probed by the adversary can therefore be perfectly simulated.
The previous reasoning is easily extended to multiple executions of the block-cipher in the
restricted model of security. We can see these multiple executions as a single execution in which
the shares ski of the secret-key are initially provided as input. Namely the shares ski used in one
execution are applied the initial and final Key Shares Refreshing procedures in this same execution
and then used as input for the next execution. In the “unwound” execution the adversary can obtain
up to t intermediate variables in each of the concatenated sub-executions Q. Since in the restricted
model these t intermediate variables are the same in each sub-execution Q, we can keep the same
subset I of indices for the “unwound” execution and the simulation proof can proceed as before.
This proves the security of our construction in the restricted model of security, for n ≥ 2t+ 1.
A.3 Security in the Full Model, for n ≥ 4t + 1
For ease of exposition we first prove the security in the full model under the stronger bound n ≥ 4t+1.
For this we prove a different lemma for the Key Refreshing Operation; instead of considering the
output shares sk′|I as in Lemma 7 we prove a stronger property: we show that any subset J of at
most 2t output shares from Algorithm 4 can be perfectly simulated.
Lemma 8. Let (ski)1≤i≤n be the input shares of Algorithm 4, where n ≥ 4t + 1. For any set
of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices such that |I| ≤ 2t and the
distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from the values sk|I . Moreover for any
subset J ⊂ [1, n] such that |J | ≤ 2t we can perfectly simulate the output shares sk′|J .
Proof. The subset I is constructed as previously. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation is
probed, we add j to I. We get |I| ≤ t ≤ 2t. Note that we use the weaker bound |I| ≤ 2t because
when considering the full block-cipher the subset I will be constructed from all n-shared operations,
instead of only the Key Shares Refreshing operation; this includes Algorithm 1 in which a single
probe can add 2 indices in I, which gives the bound |I| ≤ 2t.
Since t < n there exists at least one RefreshMasks operation that is not probed at all, corre-
sponding to index i∗. Since this i∗-th RefreshMasks operation is not probed at all, we can perfectly
simulate any set of n− 1 ≥ 4t shares as output of this i∗-th RefreshMasks. We can therefore simulate
the shares corresponding to the (at most) 2t indices in J , and also the shares corresponding to the
(at most) 2t indices in I. Note that the two subsets I and J are not necessarily disjoint; however the
simulation requires |J ∪ I| < n; this condition is satisfied since |J ∪ I| ≤ |J |+ |I| ≤ 2t+ 2t ≤ 4t < n.
Note that the condition n ≥ 4t+ 1 is necessary for our simulation to work; if we only had n ≥ 2t+ 1
then we could not necessarily simulate the shares from both J and I, as we could have |J ∪ I| = n
and be unable to simulate the output shares without knowing the secret-key sk. The previous
simulation after the i∗-th RefreshMasks is then propagated to the output of Algorithm 4.
In summary we can perfectly simulate any intermediate variable ski for i ∈ I, knowing the input
shares sk|I . By definition of I this covers all the probed intermediate variables. Moreover any subset
J of 2t output shares can be perfectly simulated. This proves the lemma. uunionsq
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 1 under the stronger condition n ≥ 4t+1. In the full model
of security the adversary can adaptively change the t probed intermediate variables between each of
the sub-executions Q. Therefore we obtain a different subset I of indices for each sub-execution
Q. More precisely for each sub-execution Q we compute a global subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices by
examining each n-shared operation in the sub-execution, as previously. From the previous lemmas in
each n-shared operation a probe adds at most 2 indices in I. Since a total of t intermediate variables
in the full block-cipher can be probed by the adversary, the size of the set I in each sub-execution
will still be bounded by 2t.
Assume that we know the input shares skin|I for the set of indices I of a given sub-execution Q.
We can therefore perfectly simulate the t intermediate variables probed by the adversary in this
sub-execution Q. Consider now the next execution Q′, in which the simulation of the t intermediate
variables requires the knowledge of the input shares skin|I′ for a possibly different subset I
′. Recall
that in each sub-execution Q the key shares are applied the initial and final Key Share Refreshing
procedures and then provided as input to the next sub-execution Q′. We can now use the property
shown in Lemma 8: any subset J of at most 2t output variables skouti from the final Key Share
Refreshing procedure of sub-execution Q can be perfectly simulated. We can then “connect” the
two executions as follows. Since |I ′| ≤ 2t we can take J = I ′, which enables to perfectly simulate
the output shares skout|J of sub-execution Q which are the same as the input shares sk
in
|I′ of the next
sub-execution Q′. Therefore we can maintain the invariant that in each sub-execution Q with subset
I the shares skin|I as input to sub-execution Q are perfectly simulated. The simulation can then
proceed as before from one sub-execution to the next; inductively the values of all t intermediate
variables probed by the adversary can be perfectly simulated in each sub-execution. Note that the
previous property from Lemma 8 requires the stronger bound n ≥ 4t+ 1 instead of n ≥ 2t+ 1.
Note that under this stronger bound n ≥ 4t+1 we did not need the initial Key Shares Refreshing
operation, which is actually unnecessary. However this initial Key Shares Refreshing operation will
be required to obtain the improved bound n ≥ 2t+ 1 in the next section.
A.4 Security in the Full Model for n ≥ 2t + 1
We now prove a lemma specifically for the initial Key Shares Refreshing operation.
Lemma 9 (Initial Key Shares Refreshing). Let (ski)1≤i≤n be the input shares of Algorithm 4,
where n ≥ 2t+ 1. For any set of t intermediate variables, there exists subsets I, I2 ⊂ [1, n] of indices
with |I| ≤ 2t and |I2| ≤ t such that the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated
from the values sk|I2, and the distribution of the output shares sk
′
|I can be perfectly simulated.
Proof. Since t < n there exists at least one RefreshMasks operation that is not probed at all,
corresponding to index i∗.
The subset I2 is constructed as follows. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation of index
i < i∗ is probed, we add j to I2. We get |I2| ≤ t.
The subset I is constructed as follows. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation of index
i > i∗ is probed, we add j to I. We get |I| ≤ t ≤ 2t.
Since the i∗-th RefreshMasks operation is not probed at all, we can perfectly simulate any set
of n− 1 ≥ 2t shares as output of this i∗-th RefreshMasks. We can therefore perfectly simulate the
shares corresponding to the (at most) 2t indices in I. This simulation can be propagated to the
output shares sk′|I of Algorithm 4.
In summary before the i∗-th RefreshMasks we can perfectly simulate any intermediate variable
skj for j ∈ I2, knowing the input shares sk|I2 . And after the i∗-th RefreshMasks we can perfectly
simulate any intermediate variable skj for j ∈ I. By definition of I2 and I this covers all the probed
intermediate variables. This proves the lemma. uunionsq
Our second lemma concerns the final Key Shares Refreshing. As previously instead of considering
the output shares sk′|I for the subset I as in Lemma 7, we prove a stronger property, namely that
the output shares sk′|J can be perfectly simulated for any subset J ⊂ [1, n] such that |J | ≤ t.
Lemma 10 (Final Key Shares Refreshing). Let (ski)1≤i≤n be the input shares of Algorithm 4,
where n ≥ 2t+ 1. For any set of t intermediate variables, there exists a subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices
such that |I| ≤ 2t and the distribution of those t variables can be perfectly simulated from the values
sk|I . Moreover for any subset J ⊂ [1, n] such that |J | ≤ t we can perfectly simulate the output values
sk′|J .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 9. Since t < n there exists at least one RefreshMasks
operation that is not probed at all, corresponding to index i∗.
The subset I is constructed as follows. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation of index
i < i∗ is probed, we add j to I. We get |I| ≤ t ≤ 2t.
We also construct a subset I3 as follows. If a variable skj in a RefreshMasks operation of index
i > i∗ is probed, we add j to I3. We get |I3| ≤ t
Since the i∗-th RefreshMasks operation is not probed at all, we can perfectly simulate any set
of n− 1 ≥ 2t shares as output of this i∗-th RefreshMasks. We can therefore perfectly simulate the
shares corresponding to the (at most) t indices in I3, and the (at most) t indices in J . Note that the
two subsets I3 and J are not necessarily disjoint; however the simulation requires |J ∪ I3| < n; this
condition is satisfied since |J ∪ I3| ≤ |J |+ |I3| ≤ t+ t ≤ 2t < n. The previous simulation after the
i∗-th RefreshMasks is then propagated to the output of Algorithm 4.
In summary before the i∗-th RefreshMasks we can perfectly simulate any intermediate variable
skj for j ∈ I, knowing the input shares sk|I . And after the i∗-th RefreshMasks we can perfectly
simulate any intermediate variable skj for j ∈ I3. By definition of I3 and I this covers all the probed
intermediate variables. Moreover any subset J of at most t output variables sk′i can be perfectly
simulated. This proves the lemma. uunionsq
We can now terminate the proof of Theorem 1, using essentially the same reasoning as in the
previous section.
In a given sub-execution Q the input key shares skini are provided as input to the initial Key
Shares Refreshing operation, which outputs the shares skmedi which are used by the block-cipher
operations. The key shares skmedi are then given as input to the final Key Shares Refreshing operation,
which outputs the shares skouti . These shares are then given as input to the next sub-execution Q
′.
In the full model of security the adversary can adaptively change the t probed intermediate
variables between each of the sub-executions Q. Therefore as previously we obtain a different subset
I of indices for each sub-execution Q. As previously for each sub-execution Q we compute a global
subset I ⊂ [1, n] of indices by examining each n-shared operation in the sub-execution. The only
difference is that in Lemmas 9 and 10 only a subset of the probes contribute to the construction of
the subset I. As previously in each n-shared operation a probe adds at most 2 indices in I, and
therefore the size of the set I in each sub-execution will still be bounded by 2t.
Moreover from Lemma 9 for each sub-execution Q we have a subset of indices I2 with |I2| ≤ t
such that the knowledge of input key shares skin|I2 is necessary for the simulation of the probed
variables in the initial Key Refreshing operation. Assume that we know the input shares skin|I2 ; from
Lemma 9 one can then perfectly simulate the output shares skmed|I of this initial Key Refreshing
Operation. These outputs shares skmed|I can then be used to perfectly simulate the probed variables
in the main block-cipher operations. Then from Lemma 10 knowing skmed|I one can also perfectly
simulate the probed variables in the final Key Shares Refreshing operation. The output shares
skouti are then provided as input to the next sub-execution Q
′. Since the simulation of this next
sub-execution Q′ requires the knowledge of skin|I′2 , from Lemma 10 we can again “connect” the two
executions: it suffices to take J = I ′2 (which is possible since by Lemma 9 we have |I ′2| ≤ t), which
enables to perfectly simulate the shares skout|J which are then the same as the input shares sk
in
|I′2 ,
which are then perfectly simulated for the next sub-execution Q′. The simulation can then proceed
as before from one sub-execution to the next; inductively the values of all t intermediate variables
probed by the adversary can be perfectly simulated in each sub-execution. This terminates the proof
of Theorem 1.
B Secure Multiplication with Linear Memory Complexity
In this section we show that the SecMult algorithm from [RP10] can be computed with O(n) memory
instead of O(n2). We first recall the original SecMult algorithm from [RP10], and then describe our
variant SecMult’ with O(n) memory complexity.
Algorithm 5 SecMult - masked multiplication over F2k
Input: shares a1, . . . , an such that a = a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an, and shares b1, . . . , bn such that b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn
Output: shares ci such that c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn = ab
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for j = i + 1 to n do
3: ri,j ← F2k
4: rj,i ← (ri,j ⊕ aibj)⊕ ajbi
5: end for
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: ci ← aibi
9: for j = 1 to n, j 6= i do ci ← ci ⊕ ri,j
10: end for
11: return c1, . . . , cn
Algorithm 6 SecMult’ - masked multiplication over F2k , linear memory
Input: shares a1, . . . , an such that a = a1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ an, and shares b1, . . . , bn such that b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bn
Output: shares ci such that c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn = ab
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: ci ← aibi
3: end for
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: for j = i + 1 to n do
6: s← F2k . s = ri,j
7: s′ ← (s⊕ aibj)⊕ ajbi . s′ = rj,i
8: ci ← ci ⊕ s
9: cj ← cj ⊕ s′
10: end for
11: end for
12: return c1, . . . , cn
